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Survival of the Antarctic Treaty: 
Economic Self-Interest v. 
Enlightened International Cooperation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the enactment of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, 1 the international com-
munity has cooperated in the management of Antarctica. 2 Competition for the 
known and potential mineral wealth of that frozen area of the globeS may, 
however, transform the pioneering efforts at international accord under the 
Treaty into international discord.· 
This Comment will explore substantive legal issues and disputes which may 
arise when attempts are made to locate and extract the riches of Antarctica. 
Initially the author will examine the customary international law principles of 
sovereignty!! and jurisdiction6 and their application to the problem presented. 
1. Signed at Washington, D.C., December 1, 1959, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 
4780,402 U.N.T.S. 71 [hereinafter cited as the Antarctic Treaty]. The Treaty entered into force 
on June 23, 1961. The original signatories were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, 
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. The nations that have since acceded to the Treaty are Poland (1961), 
Czechoslovakia (1962), Denmark (1965), the Netherlands (1967), Romania (1971), East Ger-
many (1974) and Brazil (1974). 
2. Su S III irifra. 
3. Resources that have the potential of being exploited in the near future are manganese 
nodules, water (as ice), geothermal energy, coal, petroleum and natural gas. In addition a great 
variety of mineral occurrences are known to exist on the continent or continental shelf of Antarc-
tica: iron (in potentially minable concentrations); copper; gold; silver; molybdenum; manganese; 
chromium; nickle; cobalt; and platinum. N. A. WRIGHf & P. L. WILLIAMS, MINERAL 
RESOURCES OF ANTARCTICA (U.S. Dep't of the Interior Geological Survey Circular 705, 1974) 
[hereinafter cited as MINERAL RESOURCES], reprinted in u.s. Policy with Rlspectto Mineral Explora-
tion and Exploitation in tht AnJarcli&: Hlaring Before tht Subcomm. on OClfJftS and International Environmtnt 
oftht Stnatt Comm. on Fortign Rlla/ioftS, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1975 
HlfJring]. 
4. A special conference of the Contracting Parties to the Antarctic Treaty was convened in 
February 1978 to attempt to deal with the problems raised by economic exploitation of the 
natural resources of Antarctica. N.Y. Times, Fc:b. 27, 1978, S A, at 10, col. 3. 
5. Sovereignty, as used in this Comment, refers to the international independence ofa State, 
combined with the right and power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign dictation. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1568 (4th ed. rev. 1968). 
6. Jurisdiction, as used herein, means the capacity of a State under international law to 
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The ramifications of the Antarctic Treaty on the permissibility of mining ac-
tivities will then be explored. Finally, possible solutions to the problems 
created by mining in the Antarctic will be discussed. 
The author proposes that: (1) the present Antarctic Treaty is structurally in-
adequate to resolve problems that may arise in connection with commercial 
mining of mineral resources; and (2) the Treaty should be augmented by a 
multinational regime to ensure the orderly and efficient exploitation of the 
economic wealth of Antarctica. Such a restructuring is necessary to keep alive 
the pioneering efforts at international cooperation that the Antarctic Treaty 
represents. 
II. SOVEREIGNTY AND JURISDICTION IN ANTARCTICA 
UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. Background 
Eight states presently claim territorial sovereignty over some portion of 
Antarctica. In order to determine whether or not these claims are legally valid 
the applicable principles of customary international law regarding acquisition 
of sovereignty over terra nulluis7 must be explored. It is also necessary to ex-
amine the theories upon which a State may base its exercise of jurisdiction in 
Antarctica. 
The Antarctic is generally defined for political purposes at the entire area 
south of the sixtieth parallel.s Until the early twentieth century, no State 
asserted supremacy over any portion of the continent or the outlying islands. 
Great Britain made the first territorial claim in 1908, followed by New 
Zealand (1923), France (1924), Argentina (1925), Australia (1933), Norway 
(1939), Chile (1940) and South Africa (1948).9 With the exception of the lat-
ter, which asserts sovereignty over only a few islands, all have claimed wedges 
of territory stretching from the coast inland to the South Pole. 10 The claims of 
the United Kingdom, Argentina and Chile overlap and were the cause off ric-
tion among the countries 11 prior to the enactment of the Treaty.12 Other in-
prescribe or enforce a rule of law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES S 6 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. 
7. TlJITa nulluis is defined as "a piece of territory not under the sovereignty of any State." D. 
GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 132 (1970). 
8. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note I, art. VI; P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, CONTROLS FOR 
OUTER SPACE AND THE ANTARCTIC ANALOGY 137 (1959) [hereinafter cited as JESSUP & 
TAUBENFELD); Hayton, The American Antarctic, 50 AM.J. INT'L L. 583, 597 (1956). 
9. JESSUP & T AUBENFELD, supra note 8, at 140-53. For an in depth examination of the Antarctic 
claims see Hayton, The Antarctic Settlement of 1959, 54 AM.J. INT'LL. 349 (1960); 1 D. P. O'CON-
NELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 450-53 (2d ed. 1970). 
10. 1975 Hearing, supra note 3, at 16. For a map showing the location of all Antarctic claims, 
see JESSUP & TAUBENFELD, supra note 8, fold-out at 1 H_ 
11. JESSUP & TAUBENFELD, supra note 8, at 149-50. 
12. The Antarctic Treaty has "frozen" territorial claims for the life of the Treaty. The Ant-
arctic Treaty, supra note I, art. IV; see S III, A irifra. 
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terested countries, including the United States, the Soviet Union andJapan, 
have not made formal claims and refuse to recognize those that are asserted. I! 
B. The Occupation Principle 
Under international law, discovery alone is insufficient to establish 
sovereignty over a territory which was previously unknown. a Occupation, the 
act of appropriation by which a State intentionally acquires territory that is 
not under the sovereignty of another State, is the only recognized mode of ac-
quiring original sovereignty.15 A State must accumulate such force inside an 
area so that it can guarantee legal order within the area's boundaries. 16 This 
ensures that the occupation be real or effectivel7 and not fictitious. Possession 
and administration of the territory by the acquiring State are the two essential 
elements that constitute an effective occupation. IS 
The principle of occupation is not an inflexible rule: Rather, it is adapted to 
fit the facts and circumstances of different situations. International tribunals 
have been satisfied with very little in the way of possession and administration 
in upholding assertions of sovereignty over inaccessible, inhospitable and 
uninhabited areas. 
In the Island of Pa/mas Casel9 a dispute between the United States and the 
13. JESSUP & TAUBENFELD, supra note 8, at 153-59; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, STATUS OF AREAS 
SOUTH OF 60° SOUTH LATITUDE, reprinted in 1975 Hean'ng, supra note 3, at 18; Toma, Soviet Attitude 
Towards the Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty in the Antarctic, 50 AM.J. INT'L L. 619 (1956). 
14. Simsarian, The Acquisition of Legal Title to Tma Nullius, 53 POL. SCI. Q. 111 (1938); 
Taubenfeld, A Treaty for Antarctica, 531 INT'L CONCIUATION 245, 251 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 
Taubenfeld]. 
15. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 555 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955) [hereinafter cited 
as OPPENHEIM]. 
16. Von der Heydte, Discovery, Symbolic AnneXlltion and Virtual Effectiveness in International Law, 29 
AM.J. INT'L L. 448, 463 (1935). 
17. OPPENHEIM,supra note 15, at 557; Bernhardt, Sovereignty in Antarctica, 5 CAUF. W. INT'LL. 
J. 297, 322 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Bernhardt]. One statement of this position is that of 
United States Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes who, in 1924, wrote: "It is the opinion of 
the Department that the discovery of lands unknown to civilization, even when coupled with a 
formal taking of possession, does not support a valid claim of sovereingty unless the discovery is 
followed by an actual settlement of the discovered country." 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 399 (1940). 
18. OPPENHEIM, supra note 15, at 557. 
19. (United States v. Netherlands), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 83 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928),2 R. 
Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1949). The United States who, by a treaty with Spain, acquired the 
Philippines by way of cession, based its title to the Island of Palmas, as successor of Spain, mainly 
on discovery. It was also maintained on the part of the U.S. that, as the Island formed a 
geographical part of the Philippines group of islands, it belonged by virtue of the principle of con-
tiguity [see text accompanying note 35 i'!fra] to the U.S. who exercised sovereignty over the 
Philippines. The Netherlands contended that it, through the Dutch East India Company, 
possessed and exercised rights of sovereignty over the Island at different periods between the mid-
seventeenth century and the end of the nineteenth century. It also contended that the rights of 
sovereignty were granted to it in treaties concluded with native princes. 
118 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2, No.1 
Netherlands concerning supremacy over the South Pacific island was submit-
ted to arbitration. The decision of the board stated the following rule: 
[M]anifestations of territorial sovereignty assume, it is true, dif-
ferent forms, according to conditions of time and place .... The in-
termittence and discontinuity compatible with the maintenance of 
the right [to sovereignty] necessarily differ according as inhabited or 
uninhabited regions are involved . . . or again regions accessible 
from, for instance, the high seas. 20 
This holding recognizes that the nature of possession and administration re-
quired to establish sovereignty over an area varies according to the nature of 
the land in question. 21 
In the later Clipperton Island Arbitration22 it was held that the establishment in 
the region itself of an organization capable of enforcing the laws of the State is 
not always necessary: 
[I]f a territory, by virtue of the fact that it was completely 
uninhabited, is, from the first moment when the occupying State 
makes its appearance there, at the absolute and undisputed disposi-
tion of that State, from that moment, the taking of possession must 
be considered as accomplished, and the occupation is thereby com-
pleted. 23 
Clipperton Island illustrates that the effectiveness of occupation which is re-
quired in any given case is that which is appropriate under the 
circumstances. 24 In other words, effective occupation is a question of fact. 
Where, however, two or more States have competing claims, all predicated on 
acts of possession and administration, the standard becomes a comparative 
one. For example, in the dispute between Denmark and Norway in the Eastern 
Greenland Case, 25 the Permanent Court of International Justice recognized that 
little exercise of rights by one State is necessary to support a valid claim to 
sovereignty provided that no other State could make a superior claim. 26 If two 
States have concurrent legal claims to the same region, the superior claim will 
be the one recognized as legitimate. 
20. /d. at 92, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 840. 
21. The Netherlands was held to have sovereignty over the Island of Palm as because of its in-
termittent exercise of sovereign rights there over a period of many years. 
22. (France v. Mexico), 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932), translating 6 REVUE GENERALE Du 
DROIT INTERNATIONALE PUBLIQUE 129 (3d ser. 1932). France commissioned a naval crew to 
make a geographical survey of the Pacific island and to proclaim French sovereignty thereover. 
This was done from the deck of a vessel a short distance offshore. A single landing of a few 
members of the crew was accomplished only after great difficulty; the party left the island without 
placing thereon any mark of French sovereignty. In Honolulu a short time later, a declaration of 
sovereingty was published. No further acts of possession or administration were performed until 
thirty years later when France protested the military occupation of the island by Mexico. 
23. Id. at 394. 
24. Dickinson, The Clipperton Island Case, 27 AM.J. INT'L L. 130, 133 (1933). 
25. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, (1933) P.C.I.J., ser. NB, No. 53. 
26. /d. at 46. 
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As a result of the foregoing cases, it is recognized that under customary in-
ternationallaw, a State will be deemed sovereign over terra nullius if it (1) has 
the intention of becoming sovereign, (2) takes possession of the area, (3) exer-
cises such administration as is necessary under the circumstances, and (4) has 
a claim superior to that of any other State. These are the criteria which are 
relevant to any assessment of the legal validity of the claims asserted over 
various portions of Antarctic territory. 
When tested against these criteria, none of the Antarctic claims appear to be 
legally sufficient.27 Although all claimant-States have the intention to act as 
sovereign, because the territories claimed are so vast and because there have 
been and are a plethora of expeditions and bases in Antarctica, no State has 
taken "absolute and undisputed" possession of its claim sector,28 or has exer-
cised sufficient acts of administration. 29 In addition, in the case of the conflict 
between Great Britain, Argentina and Chile, no State can make out a claim 
superior to that of the other two. 30 Therefore, the claims are not valid under 
the principle of effective occupation. 
C. The Sector Principle 
All claimant-States in Antarctica, except South Africa,31 also rely on the 
sector principle as a legal justification for their assertions of sovereignty over 
vast wedges of territory. 32 The sector principle of sovereignty is the theory that 
certain portions of the polar areas, that include or are adjacent to regions 
already occupied, are considered the territory of the State which claims the 
sector.!! This principle is not legitimate, however, because it is based on the 
legally invalid doctrines of continuity and contiguity. 
Continuity is the theory that coastal settlements extend inward into uncon-
trolled hinterlands and sovereignty is obtained over as much of these 
neighboring areas as is necessary for the integrity, security and defense of the 
27. Taubenfeld, supra note 14, at 258-59. 
28. It has been pointed out: 
In applying the Clipperton criteria to Antarctica, the dangers inherent in applying for-
mulae developed for a particular geographical entity (such as an island) to another area 
(such as a continent) must be recognized. While Clipperton Island is completely 
isolated and uninhabited, small, and capable of effective territorial occupation and ad-
ministration in its entirety with only a few representatives, the occupation of a continent 
is not amenable to so cavalier a treatment. In any case it could not be said that Antarc-
tica was ever" at the absolute and undisputed disposition" of any state within the pres-
ent century, given the many diverse and often simultaneous expeditions mounted there. 
Bernhardt, supra note 17, at 330-31. 
29. See JESSUP & TAUBENFELD. supra note 8, at 144. 
30. Se, id. at 149-50. 
31. See note 10 supra. 
32. In so doing, they are relying on the legal validity of their claims under the occupation prin-
ciple because such a legitimate claim is necessary before the sector principle may be utilized. In 
other words, the sector principle is dependent upon the occupation principle. 
33. Bernhardt, supra note 17, at 332. The apex of the sector is the Pole; the lateral boundaries 
are determined by longitude; and the baseline is determined by the coastline of the State or by a 
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land actually occupied.34 Contiguity is the principle that once coastal set-
tlements are established on a mainland the adjacent coastal islands, even if not 
occupied, are subsumed under the power of the coastal State because the 
security needs of the settlements demand it.35 
These two concepts are given no legal force. They contradict the general 
principle that sovereignty is co-extensive with effective occupation.36 Both 
have been repudiated. In the Island of Palmas Case contiguity was assessed as 
having "no foundation in international law" as a basis for acquisition of 
sovereign rights. 37 Continuity has been similarly rejected. 38 Because the sector 
principle also violates the doctrine of effective occupation, it, too, has no foun-
dation in law. 
Assuming arguendo that the sector principle is not invalid, the Antarctic 
claims do not fulfUI its requirements. A sector must include or be adjacent to 
sovereign territory of the claimant. As noted previously,39 no area of the Ant-
arctic has been legally obtained because the effective occupation standard has 
not been met. Without such a legal acquisition, no claimant has sovereign ter-
ritory on which to base its sector claim. Therefore, no State has a valid claim 
sector. 
D. Jurisdiction to Presm'be and Enforce Rules of Law 
Jurisdiction is that aspect of sovereignty which refers to the judicial, 
legislative and administrative competence of a State to prescribe and enforce 
rules of law, 40 The jurisdiction of a State is founded on one or more of the 
following bases: (a) territory; (b) nationality; (c) protection of State interests 
not covered by (a) or (b); and (d) protection of certain universal interests,41 Of 
immediate reference to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica are territory 
and nationality, __ 
Claimant-States consider their Antarctic claim areas to, be national ter-
ritory,42 Unless and until there is a definitive determination to the contrary,43 
they can employ the sovereign right of territorial jurisdiction to prescribe and 
certain parallel latitude, As applied in the Antarctic, the baseline for most claims is sixty degrees 
south latitude and the lateral boundaries are set in relation to areas of influence on the coast or on 
nearby islands. See note 10 supra. 
34. Bernhardt, supra note 17, at 342-45; OPPENHEIM, supra note 15, at 560. 
35. Bernhardt, supra note 17, at 339-42. 
36. OPPENHEIM, supra note 15, at 560. 
37. Island of Palmas Case, supra note 19, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 869. 
38, Bernhardt, supra note 17, at 345. 
39. See S II, A. 
40. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, S 6; I. BROWNUE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBUC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 291 (2d ed. 1973). 
41. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, S 6; United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), em. 
denied 392 U.S. 936 (1968); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.), em. denied 389 U.S. 
884 (1967). 
42. See note 48 infra. 
43. In 1956 the United Kingdom instituted proceedings in the International Court of Justice 
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enforce rules oflaw effective in their sectorsY As discussed below, +5 it is this 
alleged right of territorial jurisdiction that has the potential to convert peaceful 
Antarctica into a scene of international discord. 
In addition to the territorial base of jurisdiction, all Antarctic States, 
regardless of their status as claimants, may regulate the activities of their own 
nationals in the area. This is so because a State has jurisdiction to prescribe 
rules governing the conduct of its nationals outside its territory. +6 As a result, 
it may use its enforcement jurisdiction to give effect to such rules of action 
taken against its nationals if they are found in the territory of the State or, if 
they are not, by action taken against their property in the territoryY 
E. Summary 
The validity under customary international law of any claim to sovereignty 
in Antarctica rests primarily on the doctrine of effective occupation. The sec-
tor principle merely extends the boundaries of a claim which must first be 
established under the effective occupation standard. Prior to enactment of the 
Antarctic Treaty, no State succeeded in complying with the possession and 
administration requisites of that standard because none reduced its claim sec-
tor to its "absolute and undisputed" possession. Since the Treaty has been in 
force States have continued to manifest acts of sovereignty in their sectors. +8 It 
is possible that, under customary international law, portions of claim sectors 
might now comply with the effective occupation test, and, as a result, 
legitimatize assertions of sovereignty to those small areas. The Antarctic 
Treaty, however, precludes such a possibility. 
III. PERMISSIBILITY OF COMMERCIAL MINING OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES IN ANTARCTICA UNDER THE ANTARCTIC TREATY 
A. Background 
The Antarctic Treaty has been a model of international cooperation. This 
Treaty is an example of a political and diplomatic response to achievements in 
the scientific realm. +9 It is recognized50 that the basis of efforts to enact the 
in an attempt to get a declaration of its sovereignty over certain Antarctic and sub-Antarctic ter-
ritories. Antarctic Cases, [1956J I.C.]. Both Argentina and Chile refused to submit to the 
jurisdiction ofthe Court. The cases, therefore, were dismissed by an order of March 15, 1956. Id. 
H. This power of territorial jurisdiction has been circumscribed somewhat by the Antarctic 
Treaty. See S III, A irifra. 
45. See S III irifra. 
46. In re Guttierez, [1957J Semanario 56, 24 I.L.R. 265 (S. Ct., Mex.); see United States v. 
R. P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1957). 
47. /d. 
48. See, e.g., Argentina's Capital.' A Polar Island, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11,1976, at 7, col. 2. 
49. Hambro, Some Notes on the Future of the Antarctic Treaty Collaboration, 68 AM.]. INT'L L. 217, 
218 (1974) [hereinafter cited as HambroJ. 
50. /d. 
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Treaty was the overwhelming success of international scientific collaboration 
during the International Geophysical Year (1957-58).51 The purpose of the 
Treaty - to keep the area free for peaceful and scientific cooperation52 -
clearly reflects the importance of scientific considerations in its enactment. 
B. Sovereignty andJurisdiction Under the Treaty 
Despite the fact that the Parties wished to continue the era of scientific col-
laboration generated by the 1. G. Y. experience, the claimants overwhelmingly 
rejected proposals for a relinquishment of sovereign claims in favor of an in-
ternationization of the continent. 53 Compromises had to be formulated if 
unfettered scientific work was to continue. An accord was concluded 54 to 
enable the States to continue their cooperation unimpeded by conflicting 
political interests over sovereignty issues. 
The Antarctic Treaty treats scientific collaboration in great detail. 55 Yet, 
the most important article is Article IV which "freezes" both the territorial 
claims of the Parties and the objections thereto. 56 It also imposes a 
moratorium for the life of the Treaty on assertions of new claims or 
enlargements of existing claims. 57 This suspension of many of the contentious 
sovereignty issues is the most significant feature of the Treaty because it al-
lowed the scientific provisions to be enacted without prejudicing the juridicial 
positions of the Parties. 
51. The International Geophysical Year (l.G.Y.), which officially ran through 1957 and 1958, 
was an international effort to foster scientific cooperation in a number of fields, with Antarctic ac-
tivity figuring prominently. For a detailed treatment of the l.G.Y. in Antarctica, see PRESIDENT'S 
SPECIAL REPORT ON UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN ANTARCTICA, 
H.R. Doc. No. 358, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-6 (1964). 
52. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, preamble. 
53. Hanessian, The Antarctic Treaty 1959, 9 INT'L & COMPo L. Q. 436, 437-44 (1960). 
54. The negotiations leading up to the Antarctic Treaty were protracted, difficult and com-
pletely secret. Hambro, supra note 49, at 219. 
55. See the Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, arts. II, III, VII. 
56. /d., art. IV (1), which reads: 
Nothing contained in the present treaty shall be interpreted as: (a) a renunciation by 
any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sover-
eignty in Antarctica; (b) a renunciation or dimunition by any Contracting Party of any 
basis of or claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a 
result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; (c) prejudicing 
the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-recognition of 
any other State's right of or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarc-
tica. 
57. /d., art. IV (2), which reads: 
No acts or activities taking place while the present treaty is in force shall constitute a 
basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica 
or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an 
existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present 
treaty is in force. 
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The agreement, however, fails to regulate one vital aspect of sovereignty: 
jurisdiction. ~8 The Treaty deals with jurisdiction only as it relates to scientific 
personnel and observers. ~9 A consensus on the jurisdictional status of all others 
was not obtained because of the fears of some nations that any limitation on 
jurisdictional power might weaken their territorial claims.60 As stated by Chief 
Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden:61 
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily 
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed 
by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external 
source, would imply a dimunition of its sovereignty to the extent of 
the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same ex-
tent in that power which could impose such a restriction. 62 
To the extent that the Treaty limits the claimants' jurisdictional powers, it 
also diminishes their claims to sovereignty. Concomitantly, any divestiture of 
jurisdictional powers from the claimants would result in an investment of 
those sovereign powers in the Treaty regime itself, as it is the external source 
of the divestment. As a result, limitations on the jurisdictional prerogatives of 
the States claiming sovereignty by the Antarctic Treaty could be viewed as the 
first step towards establishment of a multinational condominium63 for the Ant-
arctic. 
Also of concern to the Parties at the time of negotiations was the status of 
claims after expiration of the Treaty. 6. Indeed, the practice of some Contract-
ing Parties has shown that they regard the Treaty regime as a temporary 
one. 6' In order to ensure that the claims to sovereignty are not compromised, 
the Treaty provides that the views of the Parties on jurisdictional questions re-
main unprejudiced,66 and that disputes over jurisdiction be resolved through 
consultation. 67 Because the Treaty does not alter pre-existing law, the exercise 
of jurisdiction in the Antarctic is dependent upon customary international 
law68 as interpreted by the governments involved. 
58. Jurisdiction is vital because it is the mechanism whereby a sovereign prescribes and en-
forces rules oflaw. In the context of this Comment, proper jurisdiction is necessary before a State 
can regulate mining in the Antarctic. 
59. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. VIII (1). 
60. C. BEEBY, THE ANTARCTIC TREATY 11-12 (1972). 
61. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
62. [d. at 135. 
63. As used herein, condominium describes that situation when two or more States exercise, 
as joint tenants, sovereignty over a territory and over individuals living thereon. OPPENHEIM, 
supra note 15, at 453. For examples of condominia, see id. at 453-55. 
64. See Bernhardt, supra note 17, at 310-16. 
65. !d. at 310-11. 
66. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. VIII (1). 
67. !d., art. VIII (2). 
68. See S II, D supra. 
124 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2, No.1 
In summary, the Antarctic Treaty does not affect the positions of the Con-
tracting Parties regarding sovereignty or jurisdiction; it merely freezes the ter-
ritorial claims and regulates the exercise of jurisdiction only as to scientists and 
observers. This failure to reconcile the conflicting positions in 1959 could be a 
major source of disruption in the future when efforts are undertaken to locate 
and extract the mineral resources of Antarctica. The claimant-States will likely 
attempt to regulate mining activities by nationals of other States in their claim 
sectors, thereby precipitating confrontation situations with those other States 
on the sovereignty and jurisdiction issues. 
C. Views Concerning the Permissibility of Mining Under the Treaty 
The compatibility of commercial mining operations with the Antarctic 
Treaty and the possibility of dealing with the subject under the Treaty has 
generated much discussion among the Contracting Parties. 69 Three views 
have been synthesized as a result of these discussions: 
1. Commercial Mining Not Permitted 
The first view70 holds that it is not possible to begin such operations under 
the present Treaty because commercial mineral exploration would disturb 
scientific activity, would adversely affect the Antarctic ecosystem and would 
raise problems of jurisdiction. A disruption of scientific investigation would 
violate a basic purpose of the Treaty - the fostering of scientific research and 
cooperation in the Antarctic.11 Similarly, activities which adversely affect the 
polar environment would be contrary to the numerous steps designed to pro-
tect the environment from unnecessary interference which have been taken by 
the Contracting Parties. 72 Finally it is felt that it is better to avoid at this time 
the problems of jurisdiction which commercial mining activities would en-
69. Report of the Working Group on Legal and Political Questions (report from the meeting 
of experts at the Fridtjof Nansen Foundation, Polhogda, Norway, May 30-June 10, 1973) 
[hereinafter cited as Working Group), reprinted in 1975 Hearing, supra note 3, at 76, 79-80. The 
position of the United States regarding commercial exploration and exploitation of Antarctic 
mineral resources is to work for an internationally agreed upon approach with the following ob-
jectives: (1) no disruption of the Antarctic Treaty; (2) no prejudice of U.S. juridical position on 
territorial claims; (3) resource activities not to be the cause ofinternational discord; (4) protection 
of the Antarctic environment; (5) non-discriminatory guaranteed access by the U.S. and others 
for exploitation purposes to any part of the Treaty area, except specially protected areas; and (6) 
stability of investment for those who develop the area. 1975 Hearing, supra note 3, at 6. 
70. Working Group, supra note 69, at 79. 
71. The Antarctic Treaty supra note 1, arts. II, III. 
n. Report of the Ninth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting §I, para. 13 (Oct. 12, 1977) 
(limited circulation, copy available in Boston College International and Comparative Law Journal of-
fices). The Parties are empowered by Article IX to meet and recommend measures concerning, 
inter alia, the preservation and conservation of Antarctic resources. The measures, termed 
Recommendations, become effective when unanimously adopted. 
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counter. 73 This view concludes that such mining is not allowed under the 
Treaty. 
2. Commercial Mining Not Directly Prohibited 
According to the second view, 74 the Antarctic Treaty does not directly pro-
hibit and at the same time does not permit commercial exploration and ex-
ploitation of mineral resources. Although the Treaty does not explicitly govern 
this matter, any action, whether unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, taken by 
any Party will violate the purposes and objectives of the Treaty75 if undertaken 
before the consent of all Contracting Parties has been given. 76 Such action 
would cause Antarctica to become the scene or object of international discord, 
thereby disrupting the international harmony of the continent. This view 
holds that commercial mining is not permitted under existing circumstances. 
3. Commercial Mining Permitted 
The third view77 maintains that, because the Antarctic Treaty does not pro-
hibit exploration and exploitation of mineral resources, any Contracting 
Party, or national thereof, could engage in such activity without causing a 
violation, as long as the activity was consistent with the relevant provisions of 
the Treaty. Those sections provide that such activity: not conflict with 
freedom of scientific investigation; include exchange of information and 
research and rights for inspection; comply with obligations to provide notice of 
expeditions; and not harm the environment. 78 
Underlying this position is the belief that economic exploitation of the Ant-
arctic is one of the peaceful purposes for the use of Antarctica referred to in 
Article I. 79 Because of this conclusion, if the above mentioned provisions are 
complied with, commercial mining is permitted. 
D. Impact of the Treaty: The Problem Presented 
Although the Antarctic Treaty solved the problems associated with scientific 
investigation,80 it ignored more contentious issues81 such as those relating to 
territorial jurisdiction and economic exploitation. As is implied by the last 
73. E.g., questions concerning taxes. See Martin v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 59 (1968), digested 
in 63 AM.]. INT'L L. 141 (1969). 
74. Working Group, supra note 69, at 79. 
75. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note I, preamble: "Antarctica ... shall not become the scene 
or object of international discord." 
76. This view necessarily assumes such consent will not be given in the mining context. 
77. Working Group, supra note 69, at 79; see Hambro, supra note 49, at 222. 
78. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note I, arts. II, III, VII; see note 72 supra and accompanying 
text. 
79. Working Group, supra note 69, at 80. 
80. See note 55 supra. 
81. Hambro, supra note 49, at 226. 
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view outlined above, a number of States may seek to exploit the mineral 
resources of the Antarctic. 82 
The foreseeable consequences of inaction8! '- unregulated activities by cor-
porations or non-Contracting Parties, or unilateral action by one of the Con-
tracting Parties - could be highly detrimental to the continuance of interna-
tional harmony in Antarctica. A solution to the legal and political problems in-
herent in commercial mining operations will have to be formulated to prevent 
a breakdown of polar cooperation. Such a solution is needed soon, before posi-
tions harden even further and before a confrontation occurs. 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A. The Problem of Politics 
Any suggested solution to the problem presented ultimately depends upon 
the exigencies of international politics. Questions of sovereignty, jurisdiction 
and economics necessarily involve emotional feelings of nationalism. These 
patriotic tendencies ought to be recognized and solutions that deal with them 
effectively should be fashioned. 
There appear to be three possible methods of resolution to the territorial 
sovereignty and economic exploitation issues associated with mining of 
mineral resources. They are a nationalistic approach, an international ap-
proach and a multinational approach. 
B. Nationalistic Approach 
The problems of sovereignty and jurisdiction could be solved through ap-
plication of the effective occupation standard to any and all territorial claims in 
Antarctica. This would require, first, a termination of the Antarctic Treaty 
because such an approach is contrary to its principles and purposes. a. Second, 
all nations would have the opportunity to establish claims in Antarctica 
because the area would have the legal status of terra nullius. Third, an orderly 
determination of the legal sufficiency of the claims could be achieved by sub-
mitting them to the International Court of Justice or to a special international 
tribunal established particularly for that purpose. Once these steps are ac-
complished economic issues would be governed solely by the laws of the 
sovereign claimants. 
82. Working Group, supra note 69, at 80; see note 69 supra. Also, oil companies are known to be 
interested in securing rights in the area. Working Group, supra note 69, at 80. See Sullivan, Drill 
Pierces Ice Shelf, Opening 'Lost World' to Scientists, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1977, at 10, col. 3, for an ex-
ample of the type of advanced technology necessary to explore for Antarctic resources. See also 
Mineral Resources, supra note 3, at 3, reprinted in 1975 Hearings, supra note 3, at 41. 
83. Working Group, supra note 69, at 81. 
84. See note 75 supra. 
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The problems associated with this resolution are, however, substantial and 
mitigate against its viability. First and foremost is the threat of violence in-
herent in efforts to obtain polar territory. This threat is most accute in the 
Palmer Peninsula region where the claims of the United Kingdom, Argentina 
and Chile overlap. Secondly, the era of scientific cooperation that the Treaty 
has fostered would come to an abrupt end. Because scientific collaboration was 
the initial raison d'etre for the Treaty, this occurrence would seem to be 
undesireable to the Antarctic States. Third, this solution would hinder rather 
than facilitate the maximization of resource exploitation within ecologically 
sound parameters. The present system of shared scientific knowledge concern-
ing the Antarctic, its resources and ecosystem, as well as present controls on 
environmental disruption,85 would be eliminated by a termination of the 
Treaty, thereby allowing individual States the freedom to pollute the now 
pristine polar area. Finally, such a solution may be viewed by many nations of 
the world as a "carving up" of the continent by a few States. Although all 
countries would be free to assert territorial claims, it is doubtful that any but 
the richest or supremely interested nations would have or devote the resources 
necessary to establish legally sufficient claims. The resulting political backlash 
could give birth to a movement to internationalize the area86 under United 
Nations auspices, thereby presenting a confrontation situation with the 
claimants. It is unwise to risk the possibility of military and political an-
tagonism inherent in the nationalistic approach. 
C. International Approach 
Another possible solution to the sovereignty. and economic exploitation 
issues presented by mineral mining in the Antarctic is a United Nations 
trusteeship over the entire Treaty area. Such an arrangement is possible under 
Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter. 87 This approach would entail a 
surrender of all present national claims of sovereignty to the United Nations. 
Actual administrative powers could be delegated to a single State, a group of 
States, such as the Antarctic Treaty nations, or to an international ad-
ministrative agency, such as the one envisaged for the management of the 
seabed and ocean floor. 88 The trustee would be charged with developing the 
resources of the area, either by itself or by granting of licenses of exploration 
and exploitation to interested parties. The profits from such an interna-
tionalization of the area would be used by the United Nations for the benefit of 
mankind as a whole. 
There are many advantages to this approach. First, scientific investigation 
85. S. note 72 supra. 
86. S. Hambro, supra note 49, at 225. 
87. U.N. CHARTERch. XII. 
88. S. Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the &a: The 197~ 
Cara&as Session, 69 AM.]. INT'L L. 1 (1975). 
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and cooperation could continue unabated. Second, the fragile Antarctic en-
vironment would receive adequate protection through regulations pro-
mulgated by the trustee. Third, the contentious questions of sovereignty and 
jurisdiction would become moot. Finally, the small and developing States not 
presently capable of or interested in establishing Antarctic claims would sup-
port such a solution because, without investment of time or money in the area, 
they could realize a potential gain through disbursement of profits.89 
One problem with the internationalization approach is the administrative 
difficulties inherent in such an unprecedented application of United Nations 
authority. A more crucial factor, however, is that it requires the States that 
have explored, claimed and/or conducted scientific research in Antarctica to 
relinquish all legal and historic rights they have in the area and receive little or 
nothing in return. 90 It seems improbable that the Antarctic States will 
acquiesce to such a solution. 91 Their economic and political self-interest will 
dictate policy to the detriment of this international approach. 
D. Multinational Approach 
A solution which embodies many of the advantages of the international con-
cept without the disadvantage of non-acquiescence is a multinational con-
dominium. 92 This approach entails a pooling of all historic and legal rights and 
interests acquired by the Antarctic States in favor of a regime. This supra-
national authority would be invested with sovereignty over the entire Antarc-
tic. The regime would be a collective, cooperative body with comprehensive 
powers, whose purpose would be the same as that of the present Antarctic 
Treaty: to ensure that Antarctica is used for peaceful and scientific purposes 
and that it not become the scene or object of international discord. 93 The con-
dominium could be established by simple amendment to the Treaty, as pro-
vided in Article XII.9. 
The advantages of this approach are substantial. First, the Antarctic Treaty 
can remain in full force, thereby ensuring continued and uninterrupted scien-
tific investigation and cooperation. Second, the polar environment would re-
main protected and further regulations ensuring minimal ecological disturb-
ance during mining operations could be enacted by the regime. Third, the 
89. JESSUP & TAUBENFELD, supra note 8, at 182-83. 
90. &, Hambro, supra note 49, at 225; Bernhardt, supra note 17, at 348. 
91. The Powers concerned with Antarctica have been so sensitive about the sovereign rights 
and claims that they would be loath to restrict their own sovereignty or to place their trust in any 
international organization. M. YDIT, INTERNATIONAUZEDTERRITORIES 77 (1961). 
92. &, note 63 supra for a defmition of condominium. 
93. &e note 75 supra. 
94. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. XII. Any amendment or modification requires 
unanimous agreement of the Contracting Parties. 
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authority would be open for accession by any State, even those not now in-
terested in the area, just as is the present Treaty. 95 This would mitigate any 
objections that the Antarctic States were monopolizing the region to the exclu-
sion ofthe rest of the world. Lastly, this approach removes from the scene the 
contentious issues of territorial sovereignty and ownership of economic 
resources. 
Yet, the most important advantage of the multinational approach is its 
political acceptability to the Antarctic States themselves. This solution 
recognizes the historic interests of the States in the area by combining those in-
terests into a new form. Each claimant-State retains a degree of sovereignty 
over Antarctic territory, sacrificing only the element of exclusivity. It is sub-
mitted that such an approach would receive general acceptance among the 
Antarctic States because it is a fair compromise of national interests in favor of 
international harmony. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The present Antarctic Treaty was founded upon the desire to continue and 
foster the era of scientific collaboration experienced during the International 
Geophysical Year. To accomplish this end a delicate formula, one which 
suspended the divisive issue of territorial sovereignty, was embodied in the 
Treaty. Until now, the formula has fulfUled its purpose. 
The impending economic exploitation of the natural resources of the Ant-
arctic threatens the viability of the present Treaty. It illuminates the fact that, 
while the freezing of sovereign claims was an adequate short-range accom-
modation of conflicting positions, it cannot deal effectively with the jurisdic-
tional issues inherent in mineral resource exploitation. This structural inade-
quacy must be remedied if the original purpose of the Treaty is to survive. 
Of the possible solutions to the problem, only a multinational approach ap-
pears to be acceptable. The two extremes of elimination of the Treaty and in-
ternationalization of the Antarctic each have disadvantages which mitigate 
against their implementation. The remaining alternative of a cooperative con-
dominium recognizes both historical interests and political realities, and com-
bines them in a regime which eliminates the contentious issues of territorial 
sovereignty and jurisdiction. Such a regime will facilitate the orderly and effi-
cient exploitation of the much needed mineral resources of the Antarctic and 
will advance the pioneering efforts of international cooperation which the Ant-
arctic Treaty represents. 
Rudy J. Cerone 
95. [d., art. XIII. 
